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NEW ERA SIGNALS AND CUSTOMER REVIEW PLATFORMS: CONCEPTUAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Jennifer J. Lee, Boston University, USA1 




Thanks to the development of the customer review platforms, which now exist for 
nearly all service categories, customers have access to more objective product information 
free from firms’ self-interest. The emerging market environment calls for further academic 
examination of how customers look for peer-provided signals when facing difficulty in 
evaluating product/service quality.  
 
Extending the signaling literature (Kirmani and Rao, 2000; Akerlof 1970; Saboo and 
Grewal 2013), the objectives of the present work are a) to introduce a novel concept of 
customer-provided New era signals as solution for quality evaluation problems (specifically, 
adverse selection and moral hazard), b) to empirically test a model of how different types of 
the New era signals (expert advisor vs. referent advisor) are sought by customers when facing 
such problems, and finally c) to examine how customers’ latent needs (cognitive knowledge 
vs. social trust) emerge in those circumstances. 
 
Based on the novel concept of New era signals, we conduct empirical studies to 
examine how customers look for New era signals (expert leader vs. referent leader) under 
different types of uncertainty condition based on their perceived risk (adverse selection vs. 
moral hazard). We conducted two experiments and adopted ANOVA for both studies. Study 
1 was designed to evaluate the participants’ need for objective knowledge and trust based on 
the type of information asymmetry problem they are focusing on (adverse selection vs. moral 
hazard). The results find support for our hypotheses indicating that when focusing on adverse 
selection, participants are more likely to feel the need for objective knowledge whereas when 
focusing on moral hazard, participants are more likely to feel the need for trust. Study 2 was 
designed to evaluate the participants’ need for objective knowledge and trust as well as their 
likelihood to seek New era signals with high expert power and referent power based on the 
type of information asymmetry problem they are focusing on (adverse selection vs. moral 
hazard). The results find support for our hypotheses indicating that when focusing on adverse 
selection, participants are more likely to feel the need for objective knowledge and more 
likely to seek New era signals with high expert power whereas when focusing on moral 
hazard, participants are more likely to feel the need for trust. The participants’ likelihood of 
seeking New era signals with high referent power was not supported. 
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